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1 SUMMARY 
This module illustrates how Generalised Lorenz (GL) Curves can be used to identify 
the best income distribution on social welfare grounds, within a set of alternative 
income distributions generated by different policy options, in many of the cases where 
ordinary Lorenz curves fail to work 
 
After illustrating some pitfalls of ordinary Lorenz Curves, a cursory presentation of the 
step-by-step procedure to check for Generalised Lorenz dominance and to infer 
welfare judgements is provided and demonstrated with some simple numerical 
examples. This module also points out the limitations of the GL approach  whenever GL 
curves cross each other. In addition, it illustrates the need, in some  cases, to further 
restrict the family of admissible Social Welfare Functions (SWF) if a unanimous 
consensus about the ranking  of a given set of income distributions has to be obtained. 
References to applications in a real country case, references to complementary 
EASYPol modules, notes for trainers and complementary capacity building facilities, 
are also provided herewith. 
2 INTRODUCTION 
This module belongs to a set of modules which discuss how to rank different income 
distributions on welfare grounds that are generated by alternative policy options, such 
as: private investment support, input subsidies, output protection. this module, is useful 
in situations where the analyst has to provide information about the likely impact of a 
policy measure such as a tax/benefit reform, infrastructural investment policy, a specific 
sectoral or sub-sectoral policy on the distribution of income, more specifically, to 
answer policy questions such as whether the policy measure under investigation leads to 
a social welfare improvement or not. 
Objectives  
The specific  objective of this module is to illustrate how GL curves can be used to rank 
income distributions on welfare grounds, in those cases where ordinary Lorenz curves 
and related Atkinson’s Theorem do not enable to infer any welfare judgement about 
given income distributions.  
 
The user will learn how to make use of GL curves, to draw conclusions on the most 
preferred income distribution within a set of possible income distributions generated by 
alternative policy options. He will also learn about the limitations of Generalised Lorenz 
curves in some cases.  
Target audience 
This module targets different categories of users in different contexts, for example:  
  trainers can use this module in capacity development activities e.g. to teach policy 
analysts how to use household data in policy work.;  
 policy analysts can use this module as reference material when carrying out their 
on-the-job tasks;  
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 lecturers in academic courses can use this material to support under-graduate 
courses in welfare economics, economic policy, development economics and related 
fields;  
 other users, such as  NGOs, political parties, professional organizations or  
consulting firms that are willing to enhance their expertise in analyzing welfare 
impacts of policies by means of analyzing changes in income distributions. 
Required background  
The trainer is strongly recommended to verify the suitability of the background of the 
trainees, notably their understanding of the concepts of “income distribution” and 
“social welfare”. In addition, a preliminary knowledge of Lorenz Curves and Lorenz 
dominance for welfare analysis is required. If this background is weak or missing, the 
trainer may consider  delivering other modules beforehand, as highlighted in the 
introduction. Other technicalities present in this module can be understood by all people 
with an elementary knowledge of basic mathematics, statistics and basic principles of 
calculus.  In particular, the user must be familiar with concepts of: 
 policy impact simulations  
 income distribution   
 Lorenz curves and technicalities  
 social welfare and social welfare functions  
 
To find relevant materials in these areas, the reader can follow the links included in the 
text to other EASYPol modules or  references 1
3 CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND: GL CURVES AND SHORROCKS’ 
THEOREM 
. A set of useful links to related 
EASYPol modules is provided in a section at the end of the document. 
This section highlights how ordinary Lorenz curves fail to rank income distributions on 
welfare grounds, whenever ordinary Lorenz curves cross or the Lorenz dominating 
distribution has a lower mean. Therefore, GL curves are introduced and the 
Shorrocks’ Theorem is presented, which in many cases allows to overcome the 
limitations of the Lorenz dominance approach. 
 
When attempting to rank income distributions on welfare grounds using Lorenz curves, 
one the following cases occurs: 
 the dominating distribution has a higher or equal  mean;  
 the dominating distribution has a lower mean;  
 there is no domination of one distribution over the other (Lorenz curves cross). 
                                                 
1 EASYPol  hyperlinks are shown in blue, as follows:  
a)  training paths are shown in underlined bold font;  
b)  other EASYPol modules or complementary EASYPol materials are in bold underlined italics;  
c)  links to the glossary are in bold; and  
d)  external links are in  italics. 
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In the first case, Atkinson’s Theorem allows us to conclude that the dominating 
distribution is welfare-superior; in the other two cases, Atkinson’s Theorem does not 
allow any conclusive judgement about welfare superiority of one distribution with 
respect to another2
 
. 
Fortunately, in many circumstances, both cases, may be solved by using GL curves, as 
developed by Shorrocks (1983). The GL curve is obtained as follows:  
The x-axis records the cumulative proportion of population, as in standard Lorenz 
curves. Its range is therefore (0,1). 
 
The y-axis records the cumulative mean income, i.e. the mean income is calculated by 
taking the cumulated income of a given share of the population, divided by the total 
population3
 
, as follows: 
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 is the cumulated income up to the ith individual. 
 
GL ordinate range is therefore ( )y,0  i.e., the  end-point of the GL curve is the mean 
income of the whole income distribution. This implies that an income distribution with 
a lower mean income than another distribution, can never be the GL dominating 
distribution. At least, at the end point, the income distribution with a higher mean 
income will dominate the one with a lower mean income. 
  
Note the relationship between GL and L curves. GL can also be obtained as the product 
of the Lorenz curve: 
Y
y
P
iL
n
i
i∑
==




 1 times the mean income 
P
Yy = , where Y is the total 
income, as follows:  
y
P
iL
P
iGL
P
Y
Y
y
P
iGL
n
i
i
×




=





×=




 ∑=1
 
 
                                                 
2 However, Lorenz curves can, of course, be used to measure inequality. 
3 Remember, that  ordinary Lorenz curves report the  cumulative proportion of income.  
EASYPol Module 002  
Analytical Tools  
 
4 
 There is a useful result linking GL curves and social welfare. 
 
Box 1 - Shorrocks’ Theorem (1983) 
 
 
Welfare prescriptions set by Shorrocks are very similar to Atkinson’s, but we are now 
comparing GL curves. This is necessary because Atkinson’s results do not cover those 
cases where the dominating distribution has a lower mean or where Lorenz curves 
cross4
 
. 
It is worth noting that for all cases where Atkinson’s results hold, GL curves and  
Lorenz curves give the same information, i.e. Lorenz dominance implies and is implied 
by GL dominance. In addition, for equal mean distributions, whenever Lorenz curves 
cross, GL curves also cross.  This is due to the fact that ordinates of both GLs are 
obtained by multiplying the ordinates of the Lorenz curves by a constant, i.e., the mean 
income which is the same for the two distributions. 
4 A STEP-BY-STEP PROCEDURE TO RANK DISTRIBUTIONS AND 
CHECK FOR GL DOMINANCE  
Figure 1, below, illustrates the necessary steps to check for GL dominance.  
 
Step 1, as usual, requires that the income distribution be ranked in ascending order. 
 
Step 2 requires that, firstly, the income distributions be checked to see if they have a 
different mean. If they had the same mean, then GL dominance would be useless.  
 
Steps 3 and 4 require that standard Lorenz curves be built and checked as to whether 
they cross or whether the dominating distribution has a lower mean income. Only in 
these two cases, standard Lorenz dominance fails to perform and GL dominance needs 
to be checked. 
 
                                                 
4 Proof of the Shorrocks’ Theorem for continuous SWF and continuous income distributions is provided 
e.g.  in Lambert, 1993, pp 62 to 66.  
If the following two conditions are satisfied: 
a)  the GL curve of  distribution Y dominates the GL curve of distribution X; 
b)  the decision-maker is income-seeking and inequality-averse (i.e. the SWF 
has positive  first  derivative and negative second derivative with respect to 
individual incomes)  
then,  social welfare is higher in Y than in X. 
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Figure 1 - How to rank income distributions and check for GL dominance  
 
 STEP  OPERATIONAL CONTENT  
     
 1  Sort income distributions by income 
level 
 
      2  Check whether income distributions 
have different mean incomes 
 
     
 3  Build Lorenz curves for each 
distribution 
 
     
 4  Verify that either they cross or that 
the dominating distribution has a 
lower mean 
 
     
 5  Build GL curves  
     
 6  Check for GL dominance  
     
 7  Conclusion: if there is GL 
dominance, then the dominating 
distribution has a higher welfare 
 
     
 
Once these preliminary steps have been taken, Step 5 requires that GL curves be built 
for each income distribution by multiplying standard Lorenz curves by mean incomes. 
Step 6 then requires that GL dominance be confirmed. Should there be GL dominance, 
then the dominating distribution also has a higher welfare (Step 7). 
5 EXAMPLE OF HOW TO RANK INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS USING GL 
DOMINANCE 
Consider the following simplified example, illustrated in Table 1, below. A given social 
group composed of five individuals, enjoys income distribution A (Table 1, column c). 
A specific policy (e.g. improved extension services in agriculture) leads to a change in 
the income distribution of the five individuals. Thanks to the new policy, individual 2 
now enjoys two additional income units, while the other individuals are left unaffected. 
The resulting income distribution is distribution F (column f).  
 
To check whether this policy leads to a welfare improvement, apply the procedure in the 
Flowchart 1. 
 
Step 1: The two distributions A and F are already sorted in ascending order (columns c 
and f). 
 
Step 2: The mean income of the distributions A and F is calculated (columns c and f last 
row). Note that the mean income of F is greater than that of A (9.0 and 9.4 
respectively). 
 
Step 3: The Lorenz curves for the two distributions are calculated. Column c reports the 
values of the cumulative shares of population (horizontal axis of L curves). Columns d 
and g report the cumulative shares of income for the A and F distributions respectively 
(vertical axis of the L curves).   
EASYPol Module 002  
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Step 4: Note that the two Lorenz curves cross each other, as reported in Figure 1a, 
below. 
  
In F, no individual is worse off in absolute terms, compared with A, because all the 
other incomes are left unchanged. In addition, the mean income has increased, from 
9 to 9.4 monetary units. Yet, Atkinson’s Theorem does not allow for any welfare 
comparison between distributions A and F, because there is no Lorenz dominance 
(Lorenz curves cross each other, as can easily be seen by looking at the cumulative 
income shares in Table 1, columns d and g).  We, therefore, try to rank A and F on 
welfare grounds looking at GL dominance.   
 
Step 5: The GL curve ordinates are calculated for distributions A and F 
(columns e and h  respectively),  and the two GL curves are plotted in Figure 1b.  
 
Step 6: Note that, in Figure 1b, distribution F, GL dominates distribution A, as also is 
apparent in Table 1,column i, where the difference of the ordinates of the GL curves are 
reported. 
 
Step 7: Given GL dominance of F over A, and if the decision-maker is income-seeking 
and inequality-averse, according to the Shorrocks’ Theorem, F is welfare-superior to A. 
 
Table 1: Accrual of additional income to an individual and GL dominance 
 
Distribution A Distribution F
Cum.share of p Income (Y) Cum.share Y% Cum.aver.Y Income (Y) Cum.sh.Y% Cum.aver.Y Diff.cum.
Individuals (hor.axis L/GL) (vert.axis of L) (vert.axis GL) (vert.axis of L) (vert.axis GL) aver.Y F-A
(a) (b) ( c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
1 20.0% 3 6.7% 0.6 3 6.4% 0.6 0.0
2 40.0% 6 20.0% 1.8 6 19.1% 1.8 0.0
3 60.0% 9 40.0% 3.6 11 42.6% 4.0 0.4
4 80.0% 12 66.7% 6.0 12 68.1% 6.4 0.4
5 100.0% 15 100.0% 9.0 15 100.0% 9.4 0.4
Total income 45 47
Mean income 9.0 9.4
Remark: In F cumulated  average incomes  below 
the level of income increased are unchanged w.r.t. 
A. Those equal or above  are greater. Generalised 
Lorenz curve of F  therefore dominates.
Remark: The cumulative average income, say, the 
ordinate of the GL curve, can also be obtained 
multyplying the cumulative share of income (the L 
ordinate) times the mean income of the distrib.
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Figures 1a and 1b - Additional income accruing to an individual and GL 
dominance  
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Welfare superiority of F, as signalled by its GL dominance, is implied by the fact that 
the SWF of the decision-maker, as made explicit in Shorrocks’  Theorem,  not only 
favours transfers from richer to poorer, but also favours income increases. Thus, even in 
the absence of transfers, additional income accruing to an individual without damaging 
any other individual is good news for the decision-maker. 
 
In this case, the L curve fails to detect welfare superiority of F because it is based on 
cumulative shares of incomes. The first individual and the first two aggregated 
individuals receive a lower cumulative share in F than in A, while the first three 
aggregated individuals receive a greater cumulative share in F (compare columns d and 
g in Table 1, above, causing crossing of L curves. Therefore, crossing of Lorenz curves 
can also occur when there is a Pareto improvement in the income distribution, as in F, 
and thus fails to perform as indicators of welfare superiority. Whereas, in these cases, 
GL curves allow us to draw welfare judgements. 
5.1 Further examples 
In the following example, distribution H is derived from distribution A, reducing by two  
units the income of the fifth individual. Table 2, below, illustrates the two distributions 
and related L and GL ordinates. The arrow indicates the income change in distribution 
H  with respect to distribution A.  The L and GL curves are illustrated in 
Figure 2a and b, below, respectively.  
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Table 2 -  GL Inferiority occurring with Lorenz dominance  
 
Distribution A Distribution H
Cum.share of p Income (Y) Cum.share Y% Cum.aver.Y Income (Y) Cum.sh.Y% Cum.aver.Y Diff.cum.
Individuals (hor.axis L/GL) (vert.axis of L) (vert.axis GL) (vert.axis of L) (vert.axis GL) aver.Y H-A
(a) (b) ( c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
1 20.0% 3 6.7% 0.6 3 7.0% 0.6 0.0
2 40.0% 6 20.0% 1.8 6 20.9% 1.8 0.0
3 60.0% 9 40.0% 3.6 9 41.9% 3.6 0.0
4 80.0% 12 66.7% 6.0 12 69.8% 6.0 0.0
5 100.0% 15 100.0% 9.0 13 100.0% 8.6 -0.4
Total income 45 43
Mean income 9.0 8.6
 H,  L dominates A although incomes in the 
lower part of the distribution are the same. This 
is due to the reduction of income in the highest 
part of the dstribution which leads to an 
increase of the shares in the lower part of the 
distribution.
Note that the GL do not cross because the 
difference between the ordinates of H and A 
are always either 0 or negative
 
 
 
Note that H L dominates A and incomes are more equally distributed. On the other 
hand, the mean income drops from 9.0 to 8.6 units. H is GL dominated by A. Therefore, 
according to Shorrocks’ Theorem, H is welfare inferior to A. Note than in H, nobody is 
better off than in A; in addition, the fifth individual is worse-off. Therefore, even if the 
income is more equally distributed, as signalled by its L dominance, H represents a 
“Pareto worsening” with respect to A. Welfare inferiority of H is due to the fact that we 
are assuming the point of view of a decision-maker who is not only inequality-averse 
but is also an income-seeker.  
 
Figures 2a and 2b - GL inferiority occurring with Lorenz dominance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Table 3, below, a further example is considered. Distribution I is the result of a policy 
the net impact of which results in mixed shifts of income from richer to poorer, i.e. one 
income unit from individual 3 to individual 1, and from poorer to richer, i.e. one unit of 
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income from individual 4 to individual 5. Use L curves to check whether A is welfare 
superior to I.  
 
Table 3 - Mixed transfers from richer to poorer and from poorer to richer 
 
Distribution A Distribution I
Cum.share of p Income (Y) Cum.share Y% Cum.aver.Y Income (Y) Cum.sh.Y% Cum.aver.Y Diff.cum.
Individuals (hor.axis L/GL) (vert.axis of L) (vert.axis GL) (vert.axis of L) (vert.axis GL) aver.Y H-A
(a) (b) ( c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
1 20.0% 3 6.7% 0.6 4 8.9% 0.8 0.2
2 40.0% 6 20.0% 1.8 6 22.2% 2.0 0.2
3 60.0% 9 40.0% 3.6 8 40.0% 3.6 0.0
4 80.0% 12 66.7% 6.0 11 64.4% 5.8 -0.2
5 100.0% 15 100.0% 9.0 16 100.0% 9.0 0.0
Total income 45.0 45.0
Mean income 9.0 9.0
 I  L dominates A for the first 60% of the 
population  but A  L dominates I for greater 
cumulated shares of the population, i.e. I presents 
lower cumulated shares of income in the lower 
part of the distribution and higher cumulated 
shares in the higher part of the distribution. 
Therefore, L curves cross. 
Note that the GL do cross because the difference 
between the ordinates of I and A are positive in 
the lower part of the curves and negative in the 
upper part.
 
 
 
In this case, L curves cross, as is apparent from Figures 3a and  3b, below, and Table 3, 
columns d and g,,above. Unfortunately, GL curves also cross. This is not  surprising 
indeed, because distributions A and I have the same mean income. In this case, GL 
curves  are simply “up-scaled” Lorenz curves. Therefore, no conclusive judgement can 
be reached at this point5
Figures 3a and 3b - Mixed transfers from richer to poorer and from poorer 
to richer 
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5 The issue of GL curves crossings is analysed in the EASYPol  Module 003: Social Welfare Analysis of 
Income Distributions: Ranking Income Distributions with Crossing Generalised Lorenz Curves. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
It is worth summarising the main results achieved so far. The basic result is that both 
Lorenz curves, and GL curves, thanks to both Atkinson’s and Shorrocks’ Theorems, are  
powerful tools for ranking different income distributions on welfare grounds. In many 
cases, when Lorenz curves fail to provide a conclusive answer, GL curves can succeed.  
 
However, unlike the case of the complete specification of a SWF, these tools may give a 
«partial ordering» of a set of income distributions, as there might be cases where both 
Lorenz and GL curves do not allow any conclusive welfare judgement, as seen for 
example in the latter case, where GL curves cross. 
 
Table 4, below, summarises all results achieved so far, highlighting all outcomes 
deriving from the combination of the type of relationship between curves and mean 
incomes of the distribution observed. 
 
Table 4 - Summary of results 
 
 
 
It is worth noting again three important aspects:  
 
 GL curves are required when either Lorenz curves cross or the dominating 
distribution has the lower mean (cases 3 and 4); 
 Case 8 cannot occur, because the end point of GL is the mean income; 
 When GL curves cross, additional restrictions on the form of W are required in any 
case (case 9). 
# Type of Dominance Mean income  Welfare ranking Restrictions on The SWF Notes 
1 L(Y)>L(X) Y=X W(Y) > W(X) Wi' > 0; Wi'' < 0 
2 L(Y)>L(X) Y>X W(Y) > W(X) Wi' > 0; Wi'' < 0 
3 L(Y)>L(X) Y<X Cannot say Need GL 
4 L(Y) and L(X) cross Whatever Cannot say Need GL 
5 GL(Y) < GL(X) Y<X W(Y) < W(X) Wi' > 0; Wi'' < 0 Can solve  # 3 
6 GL(Y) > GL(X) Y=X W(Y) > W(X) Wi' > 0; Wi'' < 0 Can solve  # 4 
7 GL(Y) > GL(X) Y>X W(Y) > W(X) Wi' > 0; Wi'' < 0 Can solve  # 4 
8 GL(Y) > GL(X) Y<X Cannot occur 
9 GL(Y) and GL(X) cross Whatever Cannot say Need further restrictions 
Legenda 
L(Y): Lorenz Curve of distribution Y 
L(X): Lorenz Curve of distribution X 
W(X): Social Welfare in X 
W(Y): Social Welfare in Y 
Wi' and Wi'': First and second derivative respectively of W w.r.t. the income of the i-th individual 
GL(Y): Generalised Lorenz Curve of distribution Y 
GL(X): Generalised Lorenz Curve of distribution X   
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7 READERS’ NOTES 
7.1 Time requirements 
The delivery of this module and related discussion may take two to three hours to an 
audience already familiar with concepts of policy, policy impact simulations, income 
and income distributions, Lorenz curves, social welfare and social welfare functions. 
7.2 Frequently asked questions 
Frequently asked questions are e.g. the following:  
 What is the meaning and role of the preferences of the decision-maker? i.e., 
what does it mean that the decision-maker is “inequality-averse” and an income-
seeker? It is important in these cases to refer to the shape of the welfare function 
imposed by the restrictions on its first and second derivatives. 
 Why do Lorenz curves fail to rank cases such as the one illustrated in Table 3, 
distribution F, even if it is apparent that nobody is worse-off? Reference has to be 
made to the fact that the Lorenz curves capture the “shares of income”, not income 
units. 
 How is the “with policy” income distribution generated? Selected trainees who 
are not familiar with how to build policy scenarios may not understand how, in 
practical cases, the “with policy” income distribution is generated, i.e. how to 
logically link the policy proposal to the new  income distribution. In addition, the 
possibility to prepare and run exercises slightly more complex than the examples 
provided in the module with real data, has to be considered.  
7.3 Complementary capacity building materials  
This module is complemented by a set of slides which support the delivery of training 
lectures. The trainer may also consider presenting the relevant segment of the  Armenia 
country case study based on real data (see reference below). 
 
7.4 EASYPol links  
This module belongs to a set of modules which discuss how to provide normative 
prescriptions when confronting alternative income distributions, i.e. how to identify the 
best income distribution in terms of social welfare, in a set of alternative income 
distributions.  It is one of the modules composing a training path addressing Analysis 
and monitoring of socio-economic impacts of policies. 
 
The following EASYPOL modules form a set of materials logically preceding the 
current module, which can be used to strengthen the background of the user: 
 EASYPol Module 000, Charting Income Inequality: The Lorenz Curve. 
  EASYPol Module 001, Social  Welfare Analysis of Income Distributions: 
Ranking Income Distributions with Lorenz Curves.  
 
Issues addressed in this module are further expanded in the following module: 
 EASYPol Module 003, Social  Welfare Analysis of Income Distributions: Ranking 
Income Distribution with Crossing Generalised Lorenz Curves. 
EASYPol Module 002  
Analytical Tools  
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A case study presenting the use of Lorenz curves to rank income distributions in the 
context of an agricultural policy impact simulation exercise with real data is reported in 
the EASYPOL Module 042 Inequality and Poverty Impacts of Selected Agricultural 
Policies: The Case of Paraguay. 
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